Visible negative attitudes towards Muslims, especially in the last decade, brought about a need to analyse anti-Muslim prejudice in detail as a cultural, political and also religious phenomenon. This article provides a micro-level quantitative analysis for 15 European Union countries using data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey for the period between 1994 and 2009. It is found that age, nationalism and being male have a positive impact on the predicted probability of displaying anti-Muslim prejudice while religiosity, education level, happiness in life and the size of the town have a decreasing impact. The article is expected to complement the scientific need for cross-national analysis of mass-level attitudes towards Muslims.
Introduction
The objective of this article is to understand the individual indicators of anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe since the early 1990s. The main research question to be answered is which individual-level factors influence European attitudes towards Muslims. In answering this question, we will be exploring a pooled data of EU-15 countries using data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey for the period between 1994 and 2009. Empirical analysis could not be extended further as the relevant question on Islamophobia is not available for the waves after 2009. However, we will not only use the quantitative data, but also provide an extensive review about the relevant literature employing qualitative methods and individual field research undertaken by different researchers in European countries since 9/11. Although there are many qualitative studies about anti-Muslim prejudice, its systematic quantitative analysis is rare in the literature, 1 and the existing ones particularly present a cross-sectional analysis. 2 This article is the first empirical analysis covering EU-15 countries for the period between 1994 and 2009 with regard to the elaboration of anti-Muslim attitudes apparent in the European public space.
The structure of this work will be as follows. First, two theories will be discussed in detail to understand the social and psychological framework of fear, prejudice, rejection and anger between the members of the majority societies and the Muslim-origin immigrants and their descendants residing in the EU. In this regard, ethnic competition theory and intergroup contact theory will be brought into light. Secondly, the concept of Islamophobia is discussed in detail with a particular focus on the aftermath of September 11 to clarify the difference between the two terms used in this text: anti-Muslim prejudice and Islamophobia. It will be asserted that the term Islamophobia is actually a discourse while the term anti-Muslim prejudice refers to the feelings of individuals based on the ramifications of the intergroup competition and contact, or the lack of such contact. Thirdly, data and the methodology employed will be explained in detail referring to the World Values Survey and European Values Survey. Eventually, the findings of the empirical analysis will be presented and discussed to present the impact of religiosity, education, gender, urban/rural space, nationalism, and the media on generating anti-Muslim attitudes.
Ethnic Competition Theory and Intergroup Contact Theory
The first question to be asked is how different is anti-Muslim prejudice from a general prejudice towards out-groups in a population? Is it just a different manifestation of this type of prejudice, or is there something fundamentally different about anti-Muslim prejudice that we should take into account? There is a large body of work on prejudice towards out-groups. 3 This paper reveals that the need for an engagement with this literature is strengthened by our empirical results, which are very similar to those reported in this broader literature, such as the positive effects of age, nationalism, media and masculinity on prejudice, and the negative effects of religiosity, education, satisfaction with life, and the size of the town. Since various determinants underlying unfavourable attitudes towards ethnic minorities in general are expected to influence anti-Muslim attitudes, 4 we want to explore two general theories: ethnic competition theory and intergroup contact theory. We will test both general theories and apply them to explain anti-Muslim prejudice in the EU 15. 5 The ethnic competition theory is based on two complementary theories, called realistic group conflict theory and social identity theory. 6 The former assumes that competition between social groups over scarce resources and values fosters conflict of interest between those groups, and eventually leads to antagonistic inter-group attitudes. 7 Furthermore, Blalock made an analytical distinction between actual and perceived competition and linked the group-level phenomenon of intergroup competition to unfavourable attitudes at the individual-level. 8 On the other hand, Bobo found another distinction between perceived competition and perceived threat, showing that the first is a strong predictor of the latter. According to Bobo, perceived threat is the most direct determinant of unfavourable attitudes towards ethnic minorities. 9 Today, perceived threat mostly derives from the representation of social, political, cultural, religious and economic phenomena by the media.
The latter, namely social identity theory applies a social and psychological perspective to explain negative attitudes towards out-groups. 10 Gordon Allport earlier argued that prejudices seem to be ethnocentrically organized. The claim that the making of prejudice reflects a social and national identity is far from new. 11 Nonetheless, there is a lack of empirically based analyses of what exactly makes sets of prejudices ethnocentrically organized. One of the central mechanisms of social identity theory is the process of categorization, 12 which leads to group identification. Social identity theory assumes that individuals have a fundamental need to perceive their own in-group as superior to other out-groups. In order to achieve such a positive group distinctiveness, individuals are expected to apply favourable characteristics that they perceive among in-group members to themselves, by means of a mental process labelled "social identification". 13 Moreover, they will perceive mainly negative characteristics among out-group members, and generalize this perception to the whole out-group. 4 Strabac and Listhaug, "Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Europe". 5 For a very good review of both theories see Michael Savelkoul et al., "Anti-Muslim Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981. 13 Rupert Brown, Prejudice: Its Social Psychology, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995. This process is labelled "social contra-identification". 14 Majority suspicion of the Muslim minority in the wake of 9/11 in the EU could be explained by means of this theory as Islam is often coupled with extremism, terrorism, suicide bombers, stoning women, honour crimes, fundamentalism and violence.
The second theoretical tradition that will be used in this work to explain anti-Muslim prejudice in the EU 15 is intergroup contact theory. Gordon W. Allport stressed that contact between groups can effectively reduce negative attitudes towards out-groups, if contact takes place under "optimal" conditions. He proposed four conditions for optimal contact that is likely to reduce prejudice. According to the model, the contact situation must be structured so that: a) the members of the two groups hold equal status within the contact situation regardless of the actual distribution of power in the wider social context; b) they would need to cooperate; c) in an effort to achieve a shared goal; and d) the contact would be supported by local authorities, customs, and/or norms. 15 Recently, Pettigrew argued that Allport's conditions are not actually so crucial for intergroup contact to reduce negative attitudes towards out-groups, though contact under these conditions is likely to reduce negative attitudes more strongly. 16 Based on these conditions, several types of contact can be distinguished. For instance, according to Amir, one of these conditions which may decrease prejudice between groups is intimate contact. 17 McLaren found that negative attitudes towards out-groups will be reduced, if a contact provides an opportunity to see that beliefs are actually similar, and the principal type of contact that could provide this opportunity is intimate contact, such as friendship. 18 Eventually, Marilyn Brewer and Rupert Brown conclude that cooperative contact seems to be the key to improving intergroup relations in the long run and changing the social psychological processes that underlie prejudice and discrimination. 19 Hubert M. Blalock offered an alternative hypothesis with regard to the effect of out-group size and quality on attitudes towards out-groups bringing the mechanisms of theories together. 20 Similarly, Schneider empirically tested what he calls "familiarization" effect of out-group size and quality, based on the idea that a society gets used to a certain out-group, in circumstances of high numbers. 21 Therefore, one could argue that there is an effect of familiarization over and above individual contact. The familiarization effect is based on a dynamic perspective, focusing on changes of the relative out-group proportion. The familiarization effect assumes a curved relationship between out-group size and perceived threat, arguing that at relatively low levels of out-group size, an increase of the out-group size is likely to foster levels of perceived threat in line with ethnic competition theory, whereas further increases of the out-group proportion will level off perceived threat. The latter effect is based on intergroup contact theory assuming that people get used to out-groups due to the inevitable contact with those groups in one's region. The empirical analysis shows that it is the size of the minority group, which is the Muslim-origin population in this article, relative to that of the majority group in the overall, or local, population. There are two contrasting accounts on this -the "group threat" hypothesis predicts the larger the size of the minority, the greater the prejudice. In contrast, "inter-group contact" hypothesis predicts reduced prejudice as a result of a greater minority group population. 22 Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the concept of Islamophobia has also emerged in psychology literature and is most commonly regarded as an irrational fear and intense dislike of Islam and Muslims. 23 Bleich defines this construct as "indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims. " 24 These negative emotions may include aversion, jealousy, suspicion, disdain, anxiety, rejection, fear, disgust, anger, and hostility. Intense feelings of dread, hostility, hatred, and fear may also stem from the belief that Muslims pose a threat to the individual, and to Western society. Cognitive judgements of Muslims as enemies, terrorists, and threats, in addition to widespread lack of knowledge about Islamic faith, further add to negative emotionality and sentiments toward Muslims. 25 Furthermore, Shryock asserts that Islamophilia, or the "generalized affection for Islam and Muslims," also contributes to the reinforcement of binary attitudes of "good Muslims" versus "bad Muslims". 26 This differentiation of friends and foes promotes stereotypes of "good Muslims," those who are moderate, Sufi, peaceful, friendly, emphasize choice and rationality in deciding whether to wear the headscarf, against the "bad Muslims" who practice violence and Shari'a law, the oppression of women, hate Jews, and are Arabic. 27 The combination of ignorance about the religion, distorted beliefs toward members of the religious group, and negative feelings concerning the religion and its members, serve as precursors for acts of discrimination. 28 This point will also be raised in our work with reference to the decreasing impact of religiosity of the members of the majority society on their Islamophobic sentiments.
An Ambiguous Concept: Islamophobia
In several European countries, labour immigration was halted in 1974 due to economic recession and electoral choices. The decision was taken as a result of the 1973 oil crisis and growing unemployment, which lessened the need for foreign labour. As the immigrants were perceived to be temporary by the hosting states, western European governments did not see any problem in delegating the needs of the immigrants for religious facilities and schooling to their home countries, the oil-rich Gulf States as well as the other migrant-sending states. This move did not help immigrants integrate into their countries of settlement; on the contrary, it prompted their countries of origin, dependent on the remittances of immigrants, to take an active role in working against their integration. Ultimately, both European governments and the migrant-sending states purposely worked against their integration for decades by the maintenance of distinct religious and cultural identities that did not result in a harmonious set of intergroup relations. 29 Furthermore, a growing proportion of Muslim origin immigrants and their descendants were prompted to socially, politically, culturally and even economically mobilize themselves within their own ethno-religious frameworks by means of constructing isolated parallel communities due to the failure of both republican and multiculturalist policies of integration. 30 Construction of isolated parallel communities has brought about two very important consequences in many European countries. On the one hand, it has reinforced ethno-religious boundaries between majority societies and migrant-origin groups leading to different forms of ethnic competition in the urban space. On the other hand, it has strengthened the process of alienation between groups leading to the decline of intergroup contact.
In such a context, Islamophobia is a much used but little understood term, which is believed to have become popular after the report by the Runnymede Trust's Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI) entitled Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. 31 In this report it is asserted that the first usage of the term was by an American newspaper reporter in 1991. "Islamophobia" was defined by the CBMI as "an unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims". There is currently no legally agreed definition of Islamophobia, and the social sciences have not developed a common definition, policy, or action to combat it either. Besides, there are a number of other possible terms to refer to negative feelings and attitudes towards Islam and Muslims, such as "anti-Muslimism", "intolerance against Muslims", "anti-Muslim prejudice", "anti-Muslim bigotry", "hatred of Muslims", "anti-Islamism", "anti-Muslimism", "Muslimophobia", "demonization of Islam" and "demonization of Muslims". 32 Recently, Kaya has coined the term Islamophobism to claim that Islamophobia has become an ideology exploited by neo-liberal right-wing populist political groups to conceal social-economic and political aspects of existing problems of poverty, exclusion, unemployment, inequality and injustice. 33 These different terms may be used to distinguish between various manifestations of the phenomena under discussion. Whether it takes the shape of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a threat to social cohesion. systematic work on the quantitative analysis of attitudes towards Muslims in Europe. Besides, all the empirical works conducted so far analyse either cross-sectional data, or several surveys for a small group of countries. 35 Helbling, for example, analyses Islamophobic behaviour in Switzerland and its evolution through time by employing two waves of the World Values Survey (in 1996 and 2007) with the same "Islamophobia" variable as we use in this article. 36 He argues that although both Islamophobia and xenophobia depend on the same factors, there are higher levels of the former than of the latter. Fetzer and Soper analyse the data for Britain, France and Germany and, argue that the tolerance level decreased in these countries after the September 11 attacks. 37 Strabac and Listhaug investigate anti-Muslim prejudices in 30 European countries by analysing the 1999-2000 wave of the European Values Study and argue that Muslim immigrants were more exposed to prejudices than immigrants in general in the majority of western-European countries. 38 They have also found that an increase in education level decreases anti-Muslim prejudice while an additional decade of age increases it by 12%. In terms of religiosity, their analysis showed little or no evidence on the level of anti-Muslim prejudice. Strabac et al. analyse attitudes towards Muslim immigrants in Norway, Sweden, the USA and the United Kingdom and, they argue that there is a negligible impact of the media on anti-Muslim attitudes due to a relatively stronger "knowledge effect". 39 Moreover, their empirical analyses show that effects of individual indicators have the same direction on antiimmigrant and anti-Muslim prejudice although their effects are stronger for the latter one. They argue that increase in age has a positive effect however, being female and higher-educated has a lessening impact on the anti-Muslim prejudice.
The Need for Cross-national Analysis of Mass-level Attitudes towards Muslims
Similarly, Wike and Grim also analysed a cross-national survey, conducted in Britain, France, Germany, Spain and the U.S., to understand the western views towards Muslims. 40 They conclude that security threats are the primary driving force of anti-Muslim attitudes rather than perceived cultural threats. 41 Their conclusion complies with the premises of the ethnic competition theory, which tends to explain fear and hatred towards out-groups by means of real threats rather than perceived threats. In terms of individual indicators, they found that high levels of religiosity, age and dissatisfaction with the country's direction have positive association with anti-Muslim prejudice although people with higher socio-economic status are found to be more tolerant towards Muslims. Accordingly, the principal aim of this article is to understand the general characteristics of individuals with a higher fear and/or intolerance towards Muslims. We are therefore mainly interested in the link between individual-level predictors and Islamophobia and, in accordance with the literature on prejudice and earlier empirical research on anti-Muslim prejudice discussed above, we test the following hypotheses using pooled survey data for the EU-15:
35 The work of Strabac and Listhaug is an exception. Their study is cross-sectional and the data they use cover period before the 9/11 attacks which, as they also point out, makes their results "highly time-specific". See Strabac H1: Older individuals are more likely to have anti-Muslim prejudice; H2: Higher educated individuals are less likely to have anti-Muslim prejudice; H3: Individuals who have more satisfaction in life and happiness are less likely to have anti-Muslim prejudice; H4: Nationalist people are more likely to have negative views towards immigrants and Muslims; H5: Anti-Muslim prejudice is more likely to be at lower levels in high-populated areas (intergroup contact theory); H6: More religious members of the majority society are less likely to have anti-Muslim prejudice; H7: The higher the size of the Muslim population, the lower will be the level of anti-Muslim prejudice (intergroup contact theory); H8: The higher the size of the Muslim population, the higher will be the level of anti-Muslim prejudice (ethnic competition theory); and H9: The September 11 terrorist attacks are more likely to increase anti-Muslim prejudice (ethnic competition theory).
Data and Methodology
In this work, we use integrated data of the World Values Survey (WVS) for three waves 42 Sweden", Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.33, No.3, 2010, p. 404-425. indirect way of learning of prejudices towards 'others', the neighbouring question decreases the risk of having reluctance to openly express negative views on Muslims.
In the empirical analysis, we aim to find out the impact of individual level indicators on the probability of having anti-Muslim prejudice. Those variables of concern are age, gender, education level, religiosity, confidence in the press, size of the town of residence, the degree of nationalism in one's political views, and happiness. Some variables, such as the confidence level, education level and the size of town, have particular importance due to their potential policy implications. One needs to further analyse some of the explanatory variables since they are of special interest due to their assumed relationship with anti-Muslim attitudes in the literature. The variable "confidence in the press" is especially important, because it will roughly show us the impact of the media representation of Islam on anti-Muslim attitudes in the EU. Two surveys conducted in 2007 and 2008 reveal that the biased and often irresponsible media coverage of events towards Muslims has become a breeding ground for anti-Muslim sentiments and acts in Western societies. 46 These surveys also show that media coverage in European countries about political and violent conflicts in Islamic countries is more than that of the coverage about other issues. In the "Annual Report on the State of Dialogue 2008", this coverage is found to be even ten times more than that of the issues discussed on other topics. Moreover, Cherribi in his paper on Islamophobia in the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany finds that the Dutch media, in addition to far-right parties, had a crucial impact on the rise of anti-Muslim attitudes in Germany and Austria after 2000. 47 Thus, we expect to find a positive effect of confidence in the media, assuming that each media instrument has on average the same level of media coverage on Islam and Muslims. Following the argument of Cherribi, one could also expect to have a similar effect of the variable "nationalist", which tells us whether a person defines herself as a nationalist person or not. In other words, the higher would be the probability of having an anti-Muslim attitude for a nationalist, as in-group favouritism may lead to negative attitudes towards out-groups. 48 Focusing on the young population in Sweden aged between 14 and 18, Bevelander and Otterbeck found that individual characteristics are of importance for attitudes towards Islam. 49 For example, they have revealed that socio-psychological factors such as "aggressiveness and restlessness" have a crucial impact on anti-Muslim behaviours. In our estimations, we analyse the importance of a general socio-psychological state of mind such as happiness in life. When Bevelander and Otterbeck summarize the general findings of quantitative studies on attitudes towards Muslims in Sweden, they argue that younger individuals living in larger cities, people with relatively higher levels of education, the ones who are more established in the labour market, and women in general are more tolerant towards Muslims compared to those who live in less densely populated areas, lower educated, older, have weaker ties to the labour market, and men in general. 50 Using the data described above, we also test the impacts of these similar characteristics on anti-Muslim prejudice.
Furthermore, a dummy variable for religiosity is included in the model to see if religious people see Muslims as a threat to their established religious groups, or observe them as another religious group with similar problems and therefore approach them with sympathy. In other words, this variable enables us to check if Muslims are considered as "a cultural, or a religious threat". 51 There are some studies which found a negative association between religiosity, and tolerance toward out-groups. 52 Wike and Grim specifically check the relationship between religiosity and anti-Muslim views, and they found negative, though weak, association between the two. 53 As it is explained below, contrary to the common belief, we found that religious people, compared to seculars, have more tolerance towards Muslims.
Besides, two other important variables are included in the full model explained below in order to test the group threat and group contact hypotheses: a dummy for the September 11 terrorist attacks and the percentage shares of Muslim population in each EU-15 country. Year dummies are dropped from the analysis when we test the effect of September 11 on the anti-Muslim prejudice. The data on percentage shares of the Muslim population are obtained from the PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life for 2010 estimates. Binary logit model is used as the method to explore the effect of various covariates on the probability of displaying anti-Muslim prejudice. The full model of the analysis is as follows: effects. Education levels of individuals are categorized into three levels according to their years of education, namely low, middle and upper education levels which are incorporated into the empirical model as dummy variables. Therefore, the low education level dummy variable (education level 1) is excluded from the model and used as a reference category. The variables of religiosity and nationalists are the dummy variables, which take the value of 1 if the individual states that s/he is religious and nationalist, and take the value of 0 otherwise. Moreover, confidence in the press is also measured with a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the respondent reports to have confidence in the press. Last but not least, we have added country and year dummies in order to capture unobserved effects on anti-Muslim prejudice stemming from country and year fixed effects. Those dummies are also important to include in the model, as the data is not available for each country at each data point. Further details about the independent variables and their coding can be found in Table 10 in the Appendix. Table 1 shows that the predicted probability of displaying anti-Muslim behaviour decreases for women and younger people when everything else is kept constant. The finding on the effect of age confirms the previous findings in the literature and also validates our hypothesis 1(H1). For example, Keeter and Kohut also found that younger people have more positive views of 54 Model specification tests are performed before the individual-level predictors.
Findings
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Muslims. 55 Wilson, however, argues that these findings do not necessarily tell us that one becomes more intolerant as s/he gets older, but it is rather something related with cohorts, or generational differences. 56 Women having more positive views towards Muslims are of special concern, because Islam is usually represented as a religion oppressing women and our finding suggests that this representation is not transformed into higher prejudice among women. Furthermore, individuals with higher levels of education have around 8% less probability of revealing anti-Muslim prejudice. Thus, our hypothesis 2 (H2) is not rejected. This finding is supported by the wide range of empirical research on the effect of education on out-group prejudice and political tolerance. Concerning the specific effect of education on anti-Muslim prejudice, Fetzer and Soper also found that higher education results in more tolerance towards Muslims in Britain, France and Germany. 57 Strabac et al. also found that higher educated individuals have more tolerance towards Muslims in Norway, Sweden, the USA and the UK. 58 Our finding also confirms what Keeter and Kohut found analysing the USA data. Moreover, religious people are found to be more tolerant toward Muslims as in line with our hypothesis 6 (H6). 59 This finding confirms the marginality argument of Fetzer that people who practice their religion belong to marginalized groups in Western societies, because of which they can act in solidarity with Muslims. 60 It is important to note that the variable we used in the analysis asks people whether they are religious or not. Thus, it does not give us information about traditional religiosity (regularly attending church, etc.), which is found to have a negative impact on anti-Muslim prejudice in the literature, but it rather shows that "unconventional religiosity" seems to better reflect the values of tolerance of religious people due to the ascribed state of their values. Similarly, Helbling also found that "religious people, independently of whether one belongs to a majority or minority religion and even if they are hostile towards immigrants in general, show some solidarity towards members of another religion". 61 Another finding is that general happiness has a negative effect on anti-Muslim prejudice which confirms our hypothesis 3 (H3) which argued that satisfaction in life makes people more tolerant toward minorities. Interestingly, unconfidence in the press has a minor but negative effect (-1.6%) on displaying anti-Muslim behaviour. Furthermore, the nationalist people are found to show about 3% more anti-Muslim prejudice than people who state that they are not nationalist, holding all other variables constant. This finding is in line with our hypothesis 4 (H4). Moreover, the increase in the size of the residency area has a negative and statistically significant impact on anti-Muslim prejudice (-0.5%). Thus, our finding confirms that residents of urban areas have lower levels of anti-Muslim prejudice as the literature suggested. 62 This result is also in line with our hypothesis 7 (H7) which aimed to test the 'inter-group contact' hypothesis. Furthermore, the size of the Muslim population is incorporated into the regression model and its results are presented in Model 7. As it can be seen from Table 1 , there is a positive association of a higher Muslim population size on the anti-Muslim prejudice, keeping all other variables constant. This finding is in line with our hypothesis 8 (H8), which confirms the 'group threat' hypothesis, however it enables us to reject hypothesis 7 (H7) in this context as it suggested just the opposite. However, one should note that this variable here only captures the average association between the number of Muslims living in a particular place and the anti-Muslim prejudice at the individual-level due to unavailability of the data about the percentage of Muslims in the respective neighbourhood.
Lastly, year dummies are important to analyse as they show the development of anti-Muslim prejudice. The effect of the September 11 attacks is already discussed in the literature and its positive effects on the increase in anti-Muslim attitudes are presented. Fetzer and Soper found that the September 11 attacks decreased tolerance in Britain, France and Germany. 63 Sheridan and Gillet, for example, found that anti-Muslim prejudice in the UK increased after 9/11. 64 Our analysis also confirms these findings and thus, supports hypothesis 9 (H9). It seems that terrorist attacks have a statistically significant impact on the increase in anti-Muslim prejudice. It is found that the odds of having anti-Muslim prejudice decreased by 39.2% in 2000 compared to 1995. However, it rises sharply by 64.6% in 2006, holding all other variables constant. If we put a dummy for the September 11 attacks into our regression model (considering Model 6 in Table 1 ), we observe that the percentage change in odds of anti-Muslim prejudice in EU-15 is 35.8%. However, one should keep in mind that this dummy also covers the effect of all the events after 2001, including the 2005 bombings mentioned earlier. Therefore, it is a total effect of terrorist events on anti-Muslim prejudice after 2001. When we look at the coefficients for the year dummies, Table 8 in the Appendix clearly shows that there was a decrease in anti-Muslim prejudice in 2000 but it seems that September 11 had a negative impact on the anti-Muslim prejudice as time dummy coefficients turned around to be again positive until 2009. Unfortunately, we are not able to see what happens after 2009 as this is the final year in the dataset. Table 8 also presents the coefficients for country fixed effects and, interestingly, we see that the most anti-Muslim prejudice exists in Belgium, Finland and Germany compared with other countries in the sample, when all other controls are held constant.
Although Table 1 presents the generalized effects of the control variables for the overall sample, we can also run the same model for each country separately in order to see if there is any interesting deviation from the findings in Table 1 . Thus, Table 7a and 7b in the Appendix present probability coefficients for the country specific regression analysis. The finding in general confirms what we had already discussed. For example, all the significant coefficients for the variable age show that older people or older cohorts are having less tolerance towards Muslims. Moreover, education dummies have a negative effect on the anti-Muslim prejudice whenever it is statistically significant and higher level of education is found to be the most significant factor to reduce anti-Muslim prejudice. Furthermore, we find that religious people have more tolerance towards Muslims in general with an exception of Greece where we observe a positive association between religiosity and anti-Muslim prejudice. The effect of confidence in media on the anti-Muslim prejudice is also similar and negative in each country whenever we find it to be statistically significant. The densely populated regions have a decreasing 63 Fetzer and Soper, "The Roots of Public Attitudes". 64 Lorraine P. Sheridan and Raphael Gillett, "Major World Events and Discrimination", Asian Journal of Social Psychology, No.8, 2005, p.191-197. effect on the level of anti-Muslim prejudice, as we have found for the pooled sample. Last but not least, the September 11 dummy is found to be positive for all the countries except for Belgium, France and Greece. It seems to decrease the anti-Muslim prejudice when we control for other covariates in those countries.
Even though Table 1 , Table 7a and Table 7b provide us with predicted probabilities for each variable separately; those values are not so useful since they are calculated using the mean value for each continuous covariate that is described in the Data and Methodology Section. Therefore, imaginary 65 individuals and their corresponding predicted probabilities for displaying anti-Muslim behaviour are presented in Table 2 . When the first two rows are compared, it can be seen that education level is a key factor to determine anti-Muslim behaviour. It reduces the probability of anti-Muslim prejudice by 8% for young males with an unconfidence in the press. The effect of education on the probability of outcome can also be seen clearly in Graph 1. The higher the education level, the lower is the probability of anti-Muslim prejudice in all age categories. Besides, for a given education status, the elderly persons have higher probabilities of Islamophobic discourse compared to the younger ones. Another group of interest is middle-aged, low educated males in large towns who also define themselves as nationalistic. It is found that these types of people have 19% probability of displaying anti-Muslim behaviour. If middle-aged, low-educated males living in large towns have unconfidence in the press, then they are likely to have a lower probability of anti-Muslim prejudice than the former type of people. Interestingly, the effect of nationalism and confidence in the press found to be similar to middle-aged, low-educated males who live in a large residency area. This could also be explained by the fact that many Muslims are still seen as a threat to national and/or European identity in many European countries, and the media coverage about Muslims or Islam could be biased using national sentiments. Table 2 presents some other types which enable us to see the overall effects of various characteristics together. Probability of Anti-Muslim Prejudice Young, low-educated males without confidence in the press 17% Young, high-educated males without confidence in the press 9% Old, low-educated male who is religious and happy Old, low-educated male who is non-religious and happy Old, low-educated male who is non-religious and unhappy 22% 24% 31% Middle-aged, low-educated, nationalist male in a large residency area Middle-aged, low-educated, nationalist male in a small residency area 19% 23% Middle-aged, low-educated male in a large residency area without confidence in the press Middle-aged, low-educated male in a large residency area with confidence in the press 17% 19% Young, low-educated, nonreligious, unhappy, nationalist male in a large residency without a confidence in the press Young, low-educated, nonreligious, unhappy, nationalist male in a small residency without a confidence in the press Young, low-educated, religious, happy, non-nationalist male in a small residency are without confidence in press Young, low-educated, religious, happy, non-nationalist male in a large residency are without confidence in press 21% 26% 15% 12% An "average" individual 15% Moreover, from Table 3 below it can be seen that the higher level of unconfidence in the press has a negligible effect on the probability of anti-Muslim prejudice; it decreases the probability by around 1%. However, this variable should be taken with caution as it does not inform us about the type of media source, or whether the media source that is followed by the respondent has an Islamophobic coverage. Similarly, Strabac et al. argues that negative and biased media representation of Muslims does not translate into much higher levels of anti-Muslim prejudice, as education and solid knowledge of current affairs may work like a filter toward those negativities. 66 Another interesting finding is that the greater the size of the residency area, the lower the probability of the outcome. This finding could be attributed to the higher probability of having interaction with the Muslim population in larger, and probably cosmopolitan, areas that might lead to a reduction in the Islamophobic discourse. Thus, one can argue that perceptions are important in determining anti-Muslim behaviours. From Table 4 , it can be observed that the probability of being Islamophobic for high-skilled individuals decreases from 11% to 8% as the size of residency area increases, and this fall is even slightly greater for low-educated individuals, which is 3.7 percentage points. The impact of the town size can also be seen from Graph 2 below. The greater the size of residency area, the lower is the probability of outcome, which can be because of high rates of interaction with Muslims in everyday life, and thus resulting in a decrease in prejudices and/or misperceptions. What we found here is in line with the 'familiarization' effect of out-group size and quality, which means that a society is more likely to get used to a certain out-group in circumstances of high numbers. 67
Graph 2 Another important issue is the impact of higher education in different town sizes. Although it has a generally lessening impact, Table 4 shows that the decrease in the probability of anti-Muslim prejudice is larger for low-educated individuals for a change in the town size from category 1 to category 8 (around 4% points) compared to a decrease of 2.3% points for highly-educated individuals. Thus, one may claim that having a higher possibility of interaction with Muslim population has a stronger impact on the lower educated than on the higher educated individuals. 68 There is also a gender difference in the predicted probability of displaying anti-Muslim prejudice. Females have lower probability when all other characteristics are held constant. Graphs 3-5 show that females have higher predicted probability of outcome when age groups, nationalism and religiosity levels are held constant. As it can also be observed from the graphs below, nationalism and religiosity have inverse effects on the predicted probabilities. The higher the level of nationalism, the higher the probability of having anti-Muslim behaviour is. This could be due to the fact that Islam and the increasing visibility of Muslims in European countries are perceived as a threat to national values by populist extreme right-wing political parties and their supporters. Besides, the probability of anti-Muslim prejudice decreases as the level of religiosity increases. More respect and tolerance towards members of other religions by the religious Christians could be an explanatory factor for this finding. 
Conclusion
Visible negative prejudices towards Muslims, especially in the last decade, have brought about a need to analyse anti-Muslim prejudice in detail as a cultural, political and also religious phenomenon. Until this time there have been many academic studies and public surveys about Islamophobia, however there is little systematic analysis of the issue. Referring to the major social and psychological theories such as ethnic competition theory and inter-group contact theory, the aim of the article was to address a few important questions by exploring a pooled data of EU-15 countries for the years between 1994 and 2009: Which individual-level factors influence the European attitudes towards Muslims? How did anti-Muslim prejudice evolve through time in the EU-15? Which countries have more negative views of Muslims? How did the 9/11 terrorist attacks affect the European attitudes towards Muslims?
We argued that one could eclectically use both theories to explain the determinants of anti-Muslim prejudice in the EU-15.
It is found out that increasing age, nationalism and being male has a positive impact on the predicted probability of anti-Muslim behaviour. On the other hand, religiosity, education level and the size of town have a decreasing impact on the predicted probability. The probability effect of upper level education on decreasing the anti-Muslim prejudice found to dominate the effects of all other coefficients in the empirical model which signals the importance of higher education in making people more tolerant towards Muslims. Another interesting finding is the positive impact of having confidence in the press. Considering the prevailing prejudices about Islam and Muslims in the media of European countries, it is not surprising to see that the press does negatively affect individuals. It seems that education cancels out the presumed negative effect of the media. However, this finding should be elaborated further, because we do not have detailed information about the type of press followed by people, or about what kind of news attracts the attention of the people in the sample. As far as the negative implications of media are concerned, we found that the ethnic competition theory is relevant to explain the negative impact of perceived threat, which mostly derives from the representation of social, political, cultural, religious and economic phenomena by the media.
Moreover, it is found that the Muslim population in the EU-15 has a positive impact on the anti-Muslim prejudice as the "group threat" hypothesis suggests although the positive effect of size of town supports the "familiarization" hypothesis. Hence, our analysis has supported the premises of the inter-group theory, which predicts that contact between groups can effectively reduce negative attitudes towards out-groups, if contact takes place under "optimal" conditions. The net probability effects of Muslim population and size of town show that the overall increase in the anti-Muslim prejudice is around 4% as the "group threat" effect is found to be far larger than the "familiarization" effect. Considering the empirical findings discussed in detail, it can be argued that an efficient shortrun policy action should be towards the elderly people, nationalists and males in order to reduce the anti-Muslim behaviour and destructive tensions in European societies that are increasingly becoming common. And in the long run, higher educated, the young, women and religious people could be asked for help in encouraging a flourishing dialogue between immigrant-origin Muslims and the mainstream society in Europe.
Going back to the questions raised earlier in the beginning of the article, our answer to the question whether anti-Muslim prejudice is different from a general prejudice towards out-groups in a population, is yes, it is. There are different determinants contributing to the construction of anti-Muslim prejudice in the EU-15: lack of education, growing mediocracy, lack of inter-group contact, essentialization of stereotypes by mainstream media, growing sense of insecurity, growing age, gendered differences, and growing populist forms of governance. The first two and the last two categories are merged to have a dummy
Confidence in press
Do you have confidence in press? A great deal; quite a lot; not very much; none at all
The first two and the last two categories are merged to have a dummy Nationalist How proud of nationality?
Very proud; quite proud; not very proud; not at all proud
The first two and the last two categories are merged to have a dummy Size of town Size of town From 1 (2,000 and less) to 8 (500,000 and more) Same coding is used
